In Short:

Cover bills reduce the punishment associated with compromising even if respondents find out about the cover bill from legislators who opposed the compromise.

Abstract

Legislators sometimes vote on bills that fail but, in the process, allow lawmakers to take an extreme position before ultimately voting to compromise. We call these proposals Cover Bills. Through two survey experiments, we show that primary voters are more supportive of a compromiser if that legislator first votes for a cover bill. Through a causal mediation analysis, we show that cover bills are effective not because they prove that the compromise was the best deal the legislators could get, but because they demonstrate that the legislator shares the voter’s ideological commitments. They reduce the punishment associated with compromising even if respondents find out about the cover bill from legislators who opposed the compromise.

About the author

Christian Fong

Incoming Associate Professor, School of Government and Policy

Christian Fong is an Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Government Policy and a faculty affiliate of the Center for Effective Lawmaking.