In Short:

Added insights from models more precisely illustrate just what kind of balance between minority rights and majority rule the reform would strike, but in others, they show that the reform could backfire on members of the majority or on the reformers who want the Senate to spend less time wrangling with obstruction.

Abstract

Reformers have offered many proposals for changing the Senate filibuster, ranging from modest adjustments to outright abolition. I draw on formal models of obstruction in legislatures to analyze the consequences of three such proposals: creating an opportunity to close debate with a simple majority vote after a sufficiently long floor debate, making it more onerous for the minority to sustain filibusters, and outright abolishing the filibuster. In each of these cases, the models offer a more complete understanding of the effects of these proposals.

About the author

Christian Fong

Associate Professor, SChool of Government and Policy

Christian Fong is an Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Government Policy and a faculty affiliate of the Center for Effective Lawmaking.