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Levon Barseghyan

Professor

  • Hopkins Bloomberg Center
    Washington, DC
  • Ph.D. Economics, Northwestern University
  • M.S. Policy Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
  • M.S. Industrial Engineering, American University of Armenia
  • Diploma Mathematics, Yerevan State University, Armenia

Levon Barseghyan is an economist whose research spans multiple fields and integrates diverse approaches within economics. Barseghyan’s work, both theoretical and empirical, is aimed at uncovering mechanisms that shape economic behavior and how such behavior is affected by market structure, economic policies and political institutions. 

Barseghyan has done pioneering work to develop methods to study the nature of risk preferences and their contextual stability, combining insights from behavioral economics and theory with state-of-the-art econometric techniques. His work offers innovative ways to conduct inference that are valid in a variety of settings beyond risk. The importance of this research agenda has been evidenced by publications in top economic journals and National Science Foundation awards.   

Barseghyan has worked on the effects of institutions and policies on economic outcomes, particularly at the intersection of growth, public finance, and political economy. This research employs carefully constructed theoretical models to shed light on the consequences of institutions or specific policies on economic and societal outcomes. Examples include slowdowns caused by lax banking regulations, theoretical and empirical analysis of barriers to entry, the link between public debt and growth, and more recently, the role of local public finances in shaping community development.

  1. Learning about Stability of Risk Preferences

    Learning about Stability of Risk Preferences

    Partial identification through minimal assumptions grounded in economic theory robustly bridges fully structural and model-free methods.

    05.01.2025

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  2. Insuring Risks Large and Small: The Role of Preferences and Limited Consideration

    Insuring Risks Large and Small: The Role of Preferences and Limited Consideration

    Limited consideration is indispensable for credible inference and welfare analysis of choice under risk in field environments.

    03.23.2026

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  3. Community Development with Externalities and Corrective Taxation

    Community Development with Externalities and Corrective Taxation

    For a broad range of initial conditions, allowing residents to tax development can increase or decrease social welfare. Regulating growth with zoning generates even worse outcomes, but allowing the community to charge developers impact fees does better.

    05.01.2022

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  4. Heterogeneous Choice Sets and Preferences

    Heterogeneous Choice Sets and Preferences

    We find that the data can be explained by expected utility theory with low levels of risk aversion and heterogeneous non-singleton choice sets, and that more than three in four households require limited choice sets to explain their deductible choices.

    09.27.2021

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  5. Discrete Choice under Risk with Limited Consideration

    Discrete Choice under Risk with Limited Consideration

    06.01.2021

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  6. Peer Preferences, School Competition, and the Effects of Public School Choice

    Peer Preferences, School Competition, and the Effects of Public School Choice

    The key innovation is to model competition between schools in an environment in which parents have peer preferences.

    11.01.2019

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  7. Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Tiebout Model

    Property Taxation, Zoning, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Tiebout Model

    These findings challenge the Benefit View of the property tax.

    08.01.2016

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  8. Bureaucrats, Voters, and Public Investment

    Bureaucrats, Voters, and Public Investment

    Steady state equilibrium reversion levels can exceed the voter’s optimal steady state level, meaning that reversion levels cannot be used to bound the optimal level. Reflecting the inability of the agents to commit to their future proposing and voting behavior, equilibrium paths are Pareto inefficient.

    11.01.2014

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